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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY GENE RUSH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 870092-CA 
) Case Priority 14.b. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a divorce action filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Defendant/Appellant appeals to this Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-
2a-3 (g) from a Decree of Divorce entered on February 10, 1987, by 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the 
marital residence and real property to the wife? 
II 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the 
1 
wife alimony? 
Ill 
Did the trial court improperly order future termination of 
defendant's visitation rights? 
DETERMINATIVE OF STATUTES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) (6) and (f) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, defendant/appellant has attached copies of the 
following as an addendum to this brief: 
1. Memorandum Decision of the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
dated December 18, 1986. 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on 
February 10, 1987. 
3. Decree of Divorce entered on February 10, 1987. 
4. U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1) (1953) . 
5. U.C.A. 78-3a-48 (1953) . 
6. U.C.A. 78-3a-2(10), (14) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action which was commenced in July of 
1985. Trial was held on November 19 and 20, 1986, before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, who rendered a Memorandum Decision 
on December 18, 1986. From a Decree entered on February 10, 
1987, defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on March 10, 1987. 
The parties were married for twenty-one (21) years and had 
2 
three children (R.187). The children's ages at the time of trial 
were twelve (12), fifteen (15) and twenty (20) (R.187). The 
appellant/husband (hereinafter husband) was in a gyro-copter 
accident in 1983, in which he sustained trauma to the brain and 
skull (R.122). This injury resulted in plaintiff having 
cognitive/intellectual dysfunction including lack of emotional 
control, decreased attention span, decreased ability to 
concentrate, difficulty with abstract thinking, a word finding 
difficulty problem, a time-concept problem, recent and remote 
memory difficulties, geographic disorientation, speech 
difficulties and fatiguability (R.136-7). Prior to the accident, 
husband was employed as a .mechanic with a monthly take-home pay 
of $1,600.00 (R.195). Husband's current total income consists of 
$708.00 in Social Security benefits (R.206). 
The respondent/wife (hereinafter wife) was employed at the 
time of trial and earning $4.50 per hour (R.196). Wife receives 
$363.00 in Social Security benefits for the two (2) minor 
children and for herself (R. 205, 217). Wife also received the 
$500.00 per month rent from the properties' real property (R.186, 
222). Finally, the adult child of the parties resides with wife 
and has an income of $325.00 per month (R.218). The wife's 
household income is therefore $1,942.00 per month. 
The principal asset of the parties' marriage is real 
3 
property located at 13231 South State Street in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah (R.187) and the only evidence presented at trial as 
to value was the sales price suggested by a realtor of $115,00.00 
(R.169). The debt on the real property is approximately 
$25,000.00 (R.219). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by 
awarding, as a practical matter, the entire marital estate to 
wife. Husband contends his disability as well wife's much 
greater income mandates he be awarded a portion of the net 
proceeds from the real property. Moreover, the lower court did 
not justify its ruling inasmuch as awarding the proceeds so that 
wife and children could obtain housing ignores husband's 
disability and housing needs. 
Husband also contends the lower court erred in awarding 
alimony to wife because wife presented no evidence on her need 
nor on husband's ability to pay. Further, husband being 
permanently disabled is the more appropriate candidate for 
spousal support given the wife's greater income. 
Finally, the lower court's apparent imposition of automatic 
termination of husband's visitation rights if husband's mother in 
any way interferes is, in effect, a termination of parental 
rights without a hearing. Further, the visitation rights order 
4 
does not address the child's best interests or the nature of any 
specific future conduct on the part of the mother and should be 
modified to require an evidentiary hearing on those issues. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE 
MARITAL RESIDENCE TO WIFE WITHOUT AWARDING A FAIR AND 
EQUITABLE PORTION TO HUSBAND. 
Admittedly, the trial court's division of property is 
cloaked with a presumption of validity, Stephens v. Stephens, 728 
P.2d 991 (Utah 1986) but such presumption evaporates when the 
trial court fails to make findings of fact regarding the values 
of property and the property division is challenged on appeal. 
Boyle v. Boyle, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 51,52 (Utah 1987) citing Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074-75 (Utah 1985). In the case at 
bar, the court made absolutely no findings as to value of the 
parties1 real property in either its Memorandum Decision or its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As such, we must turn 
to the record in hopes of gleaning some evidence on this issue. 
The only evidence concerning the value of real property is a 
statement made by counsel that the property was listed for 
$115,000.00. Wife testified that the debt on the property was 
approximately $25,000.00. This evidence results in a net equity 
position of $90,000.00, all of which the trial court awarded to 
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wife. Although the court ordered pre-separation debts to be paid 
from the sale of the property, no evidence was presented 
indicating the amount of those debts. 
Assuming, arguendo, that there exists $90,000.00 in equity, 
did the court fairly and equitably divide the parties' assets? 
Husband's position is a resounding NO I The parties' respective 
incomes are approximately equal if you compare wife's wages 
($754.00) with husband's Social Security benefits ($708.00). 
Wife, however, also receives $363.00 in Social Security benefits, 
$500.00 in rental income and has an adult child with a monthly 
income of $325.00. Wife's household income, therefore, totals 
$1,942.00 which is more than double husband's income. In light 
of his disability, the chances for husband to ever increase his 
financial position are very slim and to totally deprive him of 
any portion of the marital estate is so fundamentally unfair and 
unjust as to approach Constitutional magnitude. 
Moreover, the trial judge's justification for awarding the 
property to wife cannot be supported. Specifically, the trial 
court stated "the balance of the equity in said property is 
awarded to the plaintiff for the purpose of her procuring housing 
for her and the minor children". Nowhere in its decision does 
the court state why all of the equity is needed for wife's and 
the children's housing. Furthermore, the court did not address 
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the fact that husband would be required to obtain new housing. 
Most certainly husband will need additional funds to obtain 
housing by virtue of the sale of the marital residence. The 
lower court's justification for its award cannot therefore stand. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has affirmed an award of the 
marital residence to one spouse in King v. King, 718 P.2d 779 
(Utah 1986), that case is factually distinguishable from the case 
at bar and is not controlling. In King, the husband conveyed the 
marital residence to his wife two and one-half (2 1/2) years 
prior to the divorce proceedings. The conveyance was purely 
voluntary and without compulsion. Moreover, the wife was 
unemployed and without future opportunity for employment. As a 
result, the court held the award of the marital residence to be 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
In the present case, no conveyance of any interest has ever 
occurred and wife is currently employed with a household income 
far in excess of husband's income. King is, therefore, 
inapplicable. 
Although wife's income exceeds husband's income, we admit 
that her expenses incident to raising the two (2) minor children 
may warrant something other than a fifty/fifty division of the 
real property proceeds. Husband therefore requests the court to 
remand this matter to the trial court and award him twenty-five 
7 
percent (25%) of the net proceeds after sale of the property and 
payment of all the expenses pursuant to the Decree. 
II 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
An award of alimony must be supported by evidence and 
findings of fact demonstrating the needs of the wife, her 
inability to provide sufficient income for herself and the 
husband's ability to pay, Jones supra, at 1075. Moreover, the 
purpose of alimony is to "equalize" the parties as close as 
possible, Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983) and 
"avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving public assistance", 
Boyle supra, at 52 (citing Higley). See also English v. English, 
565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court's only finding of fact regarding alimony is 
found at paragraph 5: 
"5. Defendant is permanently disabled and receives 
Social Security benefits for himself, the spouse, and 
the minor children. Plaintiff is able-bodied, and 
employed, but does not have job training or skills..." 
The trial court's findings do not address the issue of 
wife's needs by comparing income with expenses. One reason for 
this deficiency is the fact that absolutely no evidence was 
presented at trial on wife's monthly expenses. As such, the 
trial court could not have found her "needs" because the lower 
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court did not know what, in fact, those needs were. 
Second, the trial court made no findings as to husband's 
ability to pay, but did find him to be permanently disabled and 
receiving public assistance in the form of Social Security 
benefits. Moreover, wife adduced no evidence husband has or will 
ever have an ability to pay alimony, but instead sought to show 
by testimony of husband's physicians that he was not capable of 
handling his own financial affairs. That testimony flies in the 
face of any potential finding of an ability to pay on husband's 
part and warrants a reversal of the alimony award. 
Furthermore, if the trial court had properly considered the 
purpose of alimony, it would be readily observed that, as between 
these two parties, the only potential candidate for alimony is 
the permanently disabled husband, not the wife. 
The trial court's award of alimony is wholly unjustified on 
both the facts and law and should be reversed. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING FUTURE TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS INASMUCH AS THE ORDER FAILS TO COMPLY 
WITH U.C.A. 78-3a~48(2). 
U.C.A. 78-3a-48(2) provides that: 
"a termination of parental rights may be ordered only 
after a hearing is held specifically on the question of 
terminating the rights of the parent or parents. A 
verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and 
the parties must be advised of their right to 
counsel..." 
9 
The term parental rights includes rights of reasonable 
visitation. See U.C.A. 78-3a-2(10), (14). The trial court 
ordered termination of husbandfs visitation rights if his mother 
abuses the minor son or "if the mother of the defendant in any 
way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege will 
be terminated." (emphasis supplied). Not only does the trial 
court's broad and all-encompassing language fail to address the 
nature of any alleged interference or the best interests of the 
child, but the court's automatic termination of visitation rights 
also ignores the statutory language of U.C.A. 78-3a-48(2) 
concerning termination of parental rights. 
An even more fundamental objection to the court's order is 
that it predicates husband's visitation on the conduct of a non-
party over whom he has no control. Nowhere does the court 
indicate in any of its determinations that husband can control 
the conduct of his mother. For that reason, husband should not 
be punished and deprived of his constitutional right to exercise 
his parental right of visitation without the benefit of a full 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of his mother's conduct, vis-a-
vis, the minor child. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court inequitably and unjustly awarded all the 
parties' real property proceeds. Husband should be awarded 
10 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the net proceeds and this case 
should be remanded for entry of an order in accordance therewith. 
The award of alimony is wholly unsupported by any evidence 
or findings and should be reversed in total. 
The lower court's provision concerning husband's mother's 
conduct and visitation rights should be modified to provide for a 
full evidentiary hearing during which the issues of the minor 
child's best interests, the nature of the mother's alleged 
interference and the husband's ability to prevent the alleged 
interference should be addressed. The court should therefore 
remand this matter for modification of the Decree in accordance 
with the foregoing. 
DATED this £f) day of r-, / x~s> , 1987. 
^~~u 
Respectfully submitted, 
PiHri'Krp' w. Dye 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Cn\ 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
. Salt Lake City, Utah 
\\S\ DEC 18 1986 
H. Dixcn Hindioy, Clerk 3rd Disi. Court 
\*y. By — . ' - . — • • > 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WtfTCIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
1
 •) Deputy Clerk 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY GENE RUSH, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. D-85-2636 
1. A divorce is granted to the plaintiff. 
2. Custody of the minor children is awarded to the plaintiff, 
subject to reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable times 
and places being vested in the defendant. In this regard, visitation 
will not take place at the residence or home of the plaintiff, 
and the defendant shall give 48 hours advance notice of when 
he wishes to visit with the children. The children shall not 
be required to go on visitations with the plaintiff if they 
reasonably do not desire to do so. The minor son of the parties 
may visit overnight with the defendant on those occasions when 
the defendant and the minor son so agree. The minor son is 
in no way obligated to visit overnight with the defendant, and 
may refuse to do so at any time. 
3. If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son 
by the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant 
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RUSH V. RUSH PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
in any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege 
will be terminated. 
4. The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children 
in said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable 
with him doing so. In the event they express any discomfort 
with his driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and 
make other arrangements for transportation. 
'5. The real property of the parties is ordered sold, 
and the past due debts of both parties that were incurred prior 
to separation, including the medical bills of the defendant 
shall be paid out of the proceeds of that sale. The balance 
of the equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for 
the purpose of her procuring housing for she and the minor children. 
6. Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to 
the social security payment paid to hes as the former spouse 
of a disabled person, plus $1.00^to preserve her right to alimony. 
7. Child support is awarded only in the amount of the 
support benefit payable to the minor dependent children under 
social security. The defendant is ordered to assign such benefits 
above-described, and do all other things necessary to assure 
that the spouse and children receive the same. The alimony 
and child support are limited as set forth herein, based on 
the fact that the equity of the parties in the real estate has 
14 
RUSH V. RUSH PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
been awarded to the plaintiff in lieu of any further order of 
alimony or support at this time. 
8. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and 
costs.• 
9. The balance of the issues shall be resolved as set 
forth in the Stipulation between the parties, dated November 
14, 1986. 
10. The parties are both restrained from harassing each 
other at all times. 
11. The plaintiff's attorney is to prepare the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Decree herein. 
Dated this / / d a Y o f D^e^mber^/U 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
'Jy ii 
Deputy Clerk 
15 
RUSH V. RUSH PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this /0 day of December, 1986: 
Lee Anne Walker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2520 S. State, Suite 172 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Edward K. Brass 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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FilED IN CLERK'S OfFSCE 
Salt Lake City Uiuh 
LEE ANNE WALKER 
Attorney for defendant 
2520 S. State, Suite 172 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801) 486-8331 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, ] 
PLAINTIFF ] 
v : 
LARRY GENE RUSH, ] 
DEFENDANT ] 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
I CIVIL D85-2636 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, the 
19th day of November, at 10 a.m. and thereafter as required for 
the matter to be heard. The plaintiff was present a i\d 
represented by her counsel, Lee Anne Walker. Defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel. 
Upon the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, 
exhibits received, the partial stipulation of the parties, the 
argument of counsel, the Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff has been a bona fide resident of Salt Lake 
County for more than three months prior to commencement of this 
action. 
2. The parties were married April 30, 1965, in Murray, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The parties have three children as issue of this 
marriage: 
17 
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h Oixcn ri-ndioy C^r* 3%d 0 st Coua 
0 Deputy Jlwik 
Sharon Lynn Rush, born 6-28-1966. 
Kristie Marie Rush, born 9-19-1971 
Ricky Lee Rush, born 6-24-1974 
There are no other children expected. The oldest is no longer a 
minor. 
4. Defendant has inflicted mental and physical cruelty on 
plaintiff and the children, causing plaintiff great mental 
distress. Particularly, defendant is a head trauma patient, 
having been in an accident on June 16, 1983* Plaintiff attended 
him in the hospital, and tried in every way to help him recover. 
He is physically much recovered, but his attitudes and memory 
span have been affected. He has become physically violent and 
abusive. He has defied plaintiff and the doctors, and seized the 
income, subjecting plaintiff and the children to great risks and 
financial hardships. 
5. Defendant is permanently disabled and receives Social 
Security benefits for himself, the spouse, and the minor 
children. Plaintiff is able-bodied and employed, but does not 
have job training or skills. The parties also rent a shop on the 
front of their property for FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS per 
month. 
6. The parties stipulated in Court that the personal 
property and furniture should be awarded as divided. 
7. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
custody of the parties1 minor children, subject to reasonable 
rights of visitation at reasonable times and places bring vested 
in the defendant. In this regard, visitation will not take place 
18 
at t*.e residence or home of the plaintiff, and defendant shall 
give 43 hours advance notice of when he wishes to visit with the 
children. The children shall not be required to go on 
visitations with the defendant if they reasonably do not desire 
to do so. The minor son of the parties may visit overnight with 
the defendant on those occasions when the defendant and the minor 
son so agree. The minor son is in no way obligated to visit 
overnight with the defendant, and may refuse to do so at any 
time. 
8. If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son by 
the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant in 
any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege 
will be terminated. 
9. The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children in 
said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable wJLth 
him doing so. In the event they express any discomfort with his 
driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and make other 
arrangements for transportation. 
10. The real property of the parties is ordered sold. The 
past due debts of both parties that were incurred prior to 
separation, including the medical bills of the defendant, shall 
be paid out of the proceeds of that sale. The balance of the 
equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for the 
purpose of her procuring housing for her and the minor children. 
6. Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to the 
monthly Social Security payment paid to her as the former spouse 
of a disabled person, plus $1.00 to preserve her right to 
alimony. 
19 
7. Child support is awarded to plaintiff only in the amount 
of the support benefit payable to the minor children under Social 
Security. The defendant is ordered to assign such benefits 
above-oescribed, and do all other things necessary to assure that 
the plaintiff and children receive the same. The alimony and 
child support are limited as set forth herein, based on the fact 
that the equity of the parties in the real estate has been 
awarded to plaintiff in lieu of any further order of alimony or 
support at this time. 
8. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter. 
9. The Court awards the mobile home to plaintiff, the 
1981 Subaru to plaintiff, and the truck to the defendant. The 
parties should assume the obligations of these respective items 
as awarded and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
10. The defendant is ordered to be responsible for and 
hold plaintiff harmless from any debts or judgments he incurred 
since the separation of the parties and for the repair bill 
incurred for his truck. The parties are ordered to be 
responsible for and hold each harmless from their own debts and 
obligations from the date of the divorce. 
11. The parties are both restrained from harrassing each 
other at all times. 
From the Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, according 
to law, upon the grounds of mental cruelty, to be final upon 
20 
entry. 
2. The terms of the divorce should be based on the 
stipulations of the parties and the findings and conclusions of 
the Court. 
3. If any of the Findings are conclusions of law, they 
shall be deemed Conclusions. 
DATED this day of 
./ / 
BY T,HE-C0URT 
, 198- . 
/ 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD BRASS 
Attorney for defendant 
'RICHARD/H.//10FFAT 
DISTRICT /JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
| CLERK 
puty ClerK 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of these 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to defendant's counsel, 
Edward K. Brass, at his office at 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102 postage prepaid through the U. S. mails this 26th 
day of January, 1987. 
"\ 
-**6/fr^ "CUcX, £<H 
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FILED «rt CLERKS Q?F?C£ 
Salt Lake City, 'Jtah 
LEE ANNE WALKER 
Attorney for defendant 
2520 S. State, Suite 172 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
(801) 486-8331 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA DIANE RUSH, ] 
PLAINTIFF 
v : 
LARRY GENE RUSH, ] 
DEFENDANT ) 
> DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> jS/ w- no • 3Ziu 
> 2~/i Z7 ' % '3<+ ^ 
) JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
1 CIVIL D85-2-636 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, the 
19th day of November, at 10 a.m. and thereafter as required for 
the matter to be heard. The plaintiff was present and 
represented by her counsel, Lee Anne Walker. Defendant was 
present and represented by his counsel. 
Upon the testimony of the parties and their witnesses, 
exhibits received, the stipulations of the parties, the argument 
of counsel, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a decree of divorce, to be final 
upon entry. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded the custody of the parties1 minor 
children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation at 
reasonable times and places bing vested in the defendant. 
In this regard, visitation will not take place at the residence 
or home of the plaintiff, and defendant shall give 48 hours 
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advance notice of when he wishes to visit with the children. The 
children shall not be required to go on visitations with the 
defendant if they reasonably do not desire to do so. The minor 
son of the parties may visit overnight with the defendant on 
those occasions when the. defendant and the minor son so agree. 
The minor son is in no way obligated to visit overnight with the 
defendant, and may refuse to do so at any time. 
3. If there is any problem about abuse of the minor son by 
the defendant or his mother, or if the mother of the defendant in 
any way interferes with the visitation privilege, such privilege 
will be terminated. 
4. The defendant may drive a vehicle with the children in 
said vehicle only so long as the children are comfortable with 
him doing so. In the event they express any discomfort with his 
driving, he is to cease driving them immediately, and make other 
arrangements for transportation. 
5. The real property of the parties is ordered sold. The 
past due debts of both parties that were incurred prior to 
separation, including the medical bills of the defendant, shall 
be paid out of the proceeds of that sale. The balance of the 
equity in said property is awarded to the plaintiff for the 
purpose of her procuring housing for her and the minor children. 
6. Alimony is awarded the plaintiff in a sum equal to the 
monthly Social Security payment paid to her as the former spouse 
of a disabled person, plus $1.00 to preserve her right to 
alimony. 
7. Child support is awarded to plaintiff only in the amount 
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of the support benefit payable to the minor children under Social 
Security. The defendant is ordered to assign such benefits 
above-described, and do all other things necessary to assure that 
the plaintiff and children receive the same. 
8. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter. 
9. The Court awards the mobile home to plaintiff, the 
1981 Subaru to plaintiff, and the truck to the defendant. The 
parties should assume the obligations of these respective items 
as awarded and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
10. The defendant is ordered to be responsible for and 
hold plaintiff harmless from any debts or judgments he incurred 
since the separation of the parties and for the repair bill 
incurred for his truck. The parties are ordered to be 
responsible for and hold each harmless from their own debts ^nd 
obligations from the date of the divorce. 
11. The parties are both restrained from harrassing each 
other at all times. 
12. The personal property and furniture is awarded as 
divided. 
'' '
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DATED this (' day of ~*<". A,/..; , 198_* ; . 
BY IttEL COURT r^THF  
r'7 
RICtfARD' 'H./MOFFAT 
DISTRICT /JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DiXON HINDLEY 
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
EDWARD BRASS 
Attorney for defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of this 
Decree of Divorce to defendant's counsel, Edward K. Brass, at his 
office at 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 postage 
prepaid through the U. S. mails this 26th day of January, 1987. 
^- skj- CK^JL UJcdh* 
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Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5 
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health 
of parties and children - Court to have continuing jurisdiction -
Custody and visitation - Termination of alimony. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it such orders in relation to the children, property 
and parties, and the maintenance and health care of the 
parties and children, as may be equitable... 
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-48 
U.C.A. 78-3a-48. Termination of parental rights - Grounds 
Hearing - Effect of order - Placement of child - Voluntary 
petition of parent. 
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered 
only after a hearing is held specifically on the question 
of terminating the rights of the parent or parents. A ver-
batim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties 
must be advised of their right to counsel. No such hearing 
shall be held earlier than ten days after service of summons 
is completed inside or outside of the state... 
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Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-2 
U.C.A. 78-3a-2. Definitions. - As used in this act: 
(10) "Residual parental rights and duties" means 
those rights and duties remaining with the parent after 
legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in 
another person or agency, including, but not limited to, the 
responsibility for support, the right to consent to adoption, 
the right to determine the child's religious affiliation, 
and the right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by 
the court. If no guardian has been appointed, "residual 
parental rights and duties" also include the right to consent 
to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to major medical, 
surgical, or psychiatric treatment. 
(14) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent 
elimination of all parental rights and duties, including 
residual parental rights and duties, by court order. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARS 
VS. 
LARR 
HA DIANE RUSH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Y GENE RUSH, ' 
Defendant and ' 
Appellant. 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
I AND SERVICE 
I Case No. 870092-CA 
Case Priority 14.b. 
PHILLIP W. DYER, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Larry 
Gene Rush, hereby certifies that on the £v day of July, 1987, 
the original and seven copies of the Brief of Appellant were 
filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and that four copies 
of the Brief of Appellant were hand-delivered to Lee Anne Walker, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 2520 South State Street, Suite 
172, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
DATED this ^d day of ^ 7 ^ - ^ , 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ptfillip W. Dyer 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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